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ESTABLISHING RUSSIA’S RESPONSIBILITY FOR CYBER-CRIME BASED ON
ITS HACKER CULTURE
Trevor McDougal*

I. INTRODUCTION
Russia has established a lackadaisical approach to both intellectual
property rights and cyber-crime enforcement, particularly the relatively
open nature of markets that sell unlicensed copies of software, movies,
and music within the country 1 as well as the spread of cyber-crime
seemingly originating from within the Russian Federation that causes
harm in other nations, 2 including the data breach at Target in
2013.3 These issues call into question the legal obligations Russia has in
preventing its citizens from causing disruptions outside its borders or in
limiting the damages they cause. These obligations are often complicated
*

Juris Doctor candidate, 2016, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.
See Ryan O’Connell, MPAA Names Top Online Sites Pirating Movies – Russia, You’re First,
THEWRAP: COVERING HOLLYWOOD (Oct. 27, 2014, 11:05 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/mpaanames-top-online-sites-pirating-movies-russia-150500636.html (noting that the MPAA has
identified Russian sites—both direct download and peer to peer—as being the worst online
offenders); Erik Gruenwedel, MPAA Reveals ”World’s Most Notorious” DVD Piracy Markets,
HOME MEDIA MAGAZINE (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.homemediamagazine.com/piracy/mpaareveals-worlds-most-notorious-dvd-piracy-markets-34466 (describing the Motion Picture
Association of America’s listing of the worst physical distributors of pirated content, which included
physical markets such as Mutino Market in Moscow where titles can be made to order, allowing a
purchaser to select a movie after which the DVD is created on nearby premises).
2
See Lukas I. Alpert, Cyber Attack Thought to Originate in Russia, WALL ST. J. DIGITS BLOG
(Mar. 28, 2013, 7:36 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2013/03/28/cyber-attack-thought-to-originatein-russia/ (noting that an attack targeting a spam-fighting group “appears to have been launched by a
gang of hackers from Russia”); Larry Barrett, Russia, Brazil Lead Cyber Attack Barrage,
ESECURITYPLANET
(Jan.
15,
2010),
http://www.esecurityplanet.com/trends/article.php/3858971/Russia-Brazil-Lead-Cyber-AttackBarrage.htm (noting that more cyber attacks originated from Russia than from any other country
during the third quarter of 2009); Jessica Guynn & Kevin Johnson, Is Russia Tied to JPMorgan
TODAY
(Aug.
28,
2014,
4:03
PM),
Hacking?,
USA
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/08/28/russia-jpmorgan-hacking-attack/14735649/
(questioning whether Russia is tied to a JPMorgan hacking incident in retaliation for the sanctions
imposed against Russia); Ionut Ilascu, United States Targeted by Cyber Attacks Originating from
China, the US, India, and Russia, SOFTPEDIA (Aug. 25, 2014, 09:51 AM),
http://news.softpedia.com/news/United-States-Targeted-by-Cyber-Attacks-Originating-from-Chinathe-US-India-and-Russia-456235.shtml (noting that between April and September 2013, nine
percent of the machines involved in cyber attacks against the United States and forty percent of the
machines involved in cyber attacks against Europe were located in Russia, but that “this does not
mean that the attackers were in [Russia], only that they used systems in this country”); Nicole
Perlroth, Online Security Experts Link More Breaches to Russian Government, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/29/technology/russian-government-linked-to-morecybersecurity-breaches.html?_r=0 (noting that while security experts link attacks to the government,
there is no direct evidence of involvement).
3
See Andrew Webster, Massive Target Data Breach May Have Been Caused by a Russian
VERGE
(Jan.
18,
2014,
12:59
PM),
Teenager,
THE
http://www.theverge.com/2014/1/18/5322276/target-data-breach-malware-author (noting that the
data breach “may have been caused” by a Russian national); Home Depot Confirms Data Breach,
Hit by Same Malware as Target, RT.COM (Sept. 9, 2014, 10:12 AM), http://rt.com/usa/186224home-depot-data-breach/ (noting the presence of Russian words inside the code for the virus).
1
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by the circuitous path from the creator of a potential attack to the actual
perpetrators of that attack, and then ultimately to the victims of the
attack.4
In addition to the question concerning the degree of control
necessary to attribute the actions of groups within a State to the State
itself, other questions loom in the background—does a State have any
obligation to control the actions of its private citizens that act outside of
its design or even contrary to its wishes? That is, even if a State is not
actively helping its citizens perpetrate cyber attacks, does it have an
obligation to prevent them from doing so? Can a State be held
responsible for not taking sufficient steps to prevent its citizens from
attacking governments or businesses in other countries? Because of
Russia’s history of tacit acceptance of hackers and its lack of
enforcement of its own laws against citizens when they cause damage
outside the State, Russia should be held responsible for the actions of
private citizens acting within its borders when those citizens engage in
attacks that have an impact outside of the its boundaries.
Part II of this Comment examines the historical development of a
hacker culture in Russia. In this culture, domestic violations of
intellectual property rights are rarely enforced and hacking of
international groups is rarely punished. Part II analyzes how the
government’s lack of enforcement has led to a culture that is very open
to both pirating and engaging in cyber-attacks. Part III reviews a variety
of attacks purportedly made by Russian citizens, possibly with the
assistance of the government. It also details some of the difficulties in
linking the attacks to the Russian government. Part IV describes the
current state of attribution and responsibility for actions of both groups
and individuals. Part V applies those principles to past cyber-attacks and
potential future attacks, describing why Russia can and should be held
responsible for the attacks.
II. THE GROWTH OF A PERVASIVE PIRATING
AND HACKING CULTURE
Prior to discussing the attacks purportedly undertaken by Russian
citizens, possibly with the complicity of the Russian government, it is
useful to understand the historical attitudes Russia and its citizens have
taken with respect to technology, intellectual property enforcement, and
hacking and the ultimate establishment of a culture that is conducive to,
and even supportive of, hacking.
A. Legal Situation
Legally, intellectual property has a basis in the Constitution of the
Russian Federation: “Each [person] is guaranteed the freedom of literary,
artistic, scientific, technical, and other forms of creation, and teaching.
4

See Alpert, supra note 2. Despite investigations into the attacks, reports can only state that
attacks “appear” to, “may,” or “are believed to” have originated from Russia or that machines in a
specific country were used in an attack but may have been controlled by users in another country.
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Intellectual property is protected by the law.”5 To protect intellectual
property, Russia has established a variety of federal services that perform
functions similar to the United States Patent and Trademark Office and
Copyright Office. In particular, Rospatent “is a Federal executive
authority performing functions of control and supervision in the area of
the legal protection and exploitation of intellectual property rights,
including patents and trademarks.”6 The Russian Civil Code provides a
variety of standard protections to the holders of various intellectual
property forms (copyrights, patents, trademarks, trade secrets) including
the right to exclude others from using that intellectual property,
reimbursement for damages against those who have infringed on those
rights, and seizure of infringing articles.7
In addition, the Russian Criminal Code imposes liability on violators
of copyright, patent, and trademark rights.8 The Criminal Code provides
for penalties of 200,000 rubles or an amount in accordance with the
income of the offender. Other potential penalties include forced labor for
480 hours, correctional labor for one year, or arrest for six months if the
holder of the right suffered “serious injury.” 9 Despite the legal
foundation for intellectual property, the citizenry at large is often in
violation of various forms of intellectual property.10
In the realm of hacking and cyber-crime, Russia similarly has
criminal provisions preventing unauthorized access to computer
information, preventing the creation, use, and spread of harmful
computer programs, and preventing the inappropriate use of computer
and telecommunication networks.11 The penalties for creating harmful
programs are even more severe than for infringement of intellectual
property—up to four years of prison or forced labor.12

5
KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 44(1) (Russ.)
(translation by the author, emphasis added).
6
About Rospatent, FEDERAL SERVICE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (ROSPATENT) (Nov. 2,
2012, 12:21), http://www.rupto.ru/rupto/portal/7bea6e78-fbd2-11e0-e807-8e000200001f?lang=en.
7
GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] art. 1225–1551
(Russ.),
available
at
http://www.rupto.ru/rupto/nfile/3b05468f-4b25-11e1-36f89c8e9921fb2c/Civil_Code.pdf (unofficial translation by Rospatent).
8
UGOLOVNYI KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [UK RF] [Criminal Code] art. 146–47, 180
(Russ.).
9
Id. at art. 146 (translation by the author). The penalties for violating patent rights are similar.
Id. at art. 147.
10
See Russian Federation: 2014 Special 301 Report on Copyright Protection and
Enforcement, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE 61 (2014), available at
http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2014/2014SPEC301RUSSIA.PDF (noting that “VKontakte, the most
popular online social network in Russia . . . is the largest single distributor of infringing music in
Russia, and also is a hotbed for online piracy of movies,” that “Russian IP addresses accounted for
more than 36% of the global volume of detected infringements occurring on public peer-to-peer
networks,” and that “pre-release DVDs of major film titles often appear on the Internet (and then in
pirate hard copies sold online or in markets), within a few days after the authorized theatrical
release”). In addition, Russia is still on the International Intellectual Property Alliance Priority
Watch list several years after acceding to the WTO. Press Release, International Intellectual Property
Alliance, IIPA Urges Government Action to Reduce Copyright Piracy, Open Markets, and Protect
Creators
1
(Feb.
7,
2014),
available
at
http://www.iipa.com/pdf/2014_Feb07_SPEC301_PRESS_RELEASE.pdf.
11
UGOLOVNYI KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [UK RF] [Criminal Code] art. 272–74 (Russ.).
12
Id. at art. 273.
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B. Actual Situation

As demonstrated above, the problem is not a lack of appropriate
legislation. Rather, the main issue relates to jurisprudential practices and
the lack of enforcement by authorities.13 This lack of enforcement is
particularly visible when looking at the accessibility of counterfeit or
pirated goods in Russia. Despite some indication of efforts on the part of
governmental authorities, counterfeit goods are readily available in
Russia.14 Fines are low when compared to other nations, liability is often
not imposed on infringers, and police officers frequently are hesitant to
initiate prosecution against the creators and distributors of counterfeit
goods.15 For the over 1,300 raids conducted in 2004 targeting music
pirates, an average penalty of fifty dollars was assessed—far too little to
have any punitive or deterrent effect. 16 While criminal penalties are
available for violators of intellectual property rights, civil or
administrative penalties are far more likely to be employed against the
perpetrators.17
There have been attempts to purge illegal content from Russian
websites; however, these efforts have been ineffective thus far.18 Sites
distributing pirated music, movies, and software are rampant in the
Russian Internet system, with seemingly little effort taken to stop them.19
The same facets that attract many technology businesses to Russia
may also be leading to the development of harmful elements among the
population. Google, Microsoft, and other companies seek out Russian
programmers because of their high skills and relatively low wage level.20
The Soviet Union was known for its strength in both math and science,
and this tradition continues with Russia’s current educational system.21
However, Soviet education was not limited to traditional subjects: having
lived through chronic shortages, citizens developed strategies for
survival that “included building networks, manipulating systems, [and]

13
Russian Federation: 2014 Special 301 Report, supra note 10 (noting a decline in the number
of raids in 2013 versus prior years and the general preference of the Russian authorities to go after
physical markets instead of online markets).
14
Intellectual Property Enforcement in Russia and the Ukraine, CMS CAMERON MCKENNA 12
(2013), http://www.cms-cmck.com/Hubbard.FileSystem/files/Publication/fa6e7d45-a045-41f4-a52fbaf7700885fb/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/0b4352e7-acff-4a21-a718-f0d5e2dd0fd2/(S)%20
1305-000055%20(V4)%20BROC%20Intellectual%20Property%20Enforcement%20in%20Russia%
20and%20the%20Ukrain.pdf.
15
Id.
16
Candace S. Friel, The High Cost of Global Intellectual Property Theft: An Analysis of
Current Trends, the TRIPS Agreement, and Future Approaches to Combat the Problem, 7 WAKE
FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 209, 226 (2006).
17
Esprit Eugster, Evolution and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Law in Russia, 9 WASH.
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 131, 147 (2010).
18
Nikolas K. Gvosdev, The Bear Goes Digital: Russian and Its Cyber Capabilities, in
CYBERSPACE AND NATIONAL SECURITY: THREATS, OPPORTUNITIES, AND POWER IN A VIRTUAL
WORLD 173, 179 (Derek S. Reveron, ed., 2012) (“Yuri Milner, the CEO of Digital Sky Technologies
(who sits on the presidential commission tasked with overseeing Russia’s economic modernization)
has been asked to look at ways that ‘illegal content’ could be purged from RUNET sites—a
legitimate effort certainly to deal with copyright violations. . . .”).
19
O’Connell, supra note 1.
20
CMS CAMERON MCKENNA, supra note 14, at 4.
21
Clifford J. Levy, What’s Russian for “Hacker”?, N.Y. TIMES WEEK IN REVIEW (Oct. 21,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/21/weekinreview/21levy.html?pagewanted=all.
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solving problems by any means available.”22 It would seem that this
history has helped lead to the belief that if an individual can do or gain
something (by using computer skills or intelligence), the individual has
earned what is obtained. Furthermore, the rampant corruption in Russia
has likely led the average citizen to view adherence to the law as
generally unnecessary—if the authorities do not need to obey the law,
why should an average citizen? 23 Western restrictions on technology
transfers in the 1970s and 1980s also likely contributed to the current
situation: computer specialists were forced to “disassembl[e], examin[e]
and hack[] American systems to see how they worked in order to make
them functional on Soviet systems.”24
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were simply not enough
jobs in the former Soviet bloc for the computer talent that existed.25 With
the end of the Soviet Union, large groups of talented high school and
university students had a choice: enter the legitimate job market for
salaries far below their skill level or seek much more lucrative offers
available by hacking or working for criminal organizations.26 Indeed,
hacking is not just a potential job, it is “one of the few good jobs left.”27
This has led Russians to view hacking as a positive position: hackers are
“fighters for [I]nternet freedom” and “high[ly] skilled programmer[s].”28
Russia’s late entry into the Internet era along with a culture that is
comparatively more xenophobic than others has led to the relatively selfcontained nature of the Russian Internet. “Russians tend to communicate
with Russians in Russian about Russia-related topics. . . . The Russian
blogosphere is, for the most part, an inwardly-focused social network.”29
Russians have a tendency to use Russian sites instead of Western brands
such as Google or Facebook. 30 Furthermore, government-friendly
businesses own majorities in many of Russia’s most popular sites,
including its social networking sites, to ensure that the government has
access to and control over the majority of data generated in the country.31
There seems to be an implied agreement between the Russian
government and large Russian cybercriminals: 1) do not touch anything
within Russia; 2) share anything you find that is of interest to the Russian
government; 3) participate whenever Russia needs you for “patriotic
activities.”32 As long as Russian cybercriminals follow these three rules,
they maintain an “untouchable status.”33

22
Joseph D Serio & Alexander Gorkin, Changing Lenses: Striving for Sharper Focus on the
Nature of the “Russian Mafia” and its Impact on the Computer Realm, INT’L REV. L. COMPUTERS &
TECH. 191, 192 (2003).
23
Levy, supra note 21.
24
Serio & Gorkin, supra note 22, at 193.
25
Id.
26
Xinyuan Wang & Daniel Rasbrock, Chapter 8: The Botnet Problem, in NETWORK AND
SYSTEM SECURITY 119, 123 (John A. Vacca ed., 2010).
27
Serio & Gorkin, supra note 22, at 193 (quoting a Russian hacker).
28
Roman Dremliugal, Subculture of Hackers in Russia, 10 ASIAN SOC, SCI. 158, 160 (2014).
29
Gvosdev, supra note 18, at 174.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 179.
32
Perlroth, supra note 2 (quoting Tom Kellerman, Chief Cybersecurity Officer at Trend
Micro).
33
Id. (quoting Tom Kellerman).

59

SUMMER 2015

RUSSIA’S RESPONSIBILITY FOR CYBER CRIME

Evidence seems to suggest that law enforcement actions are taken
against hackers after they target Russian institutions—there is no haste in
prosecuting those who are attack the West.34 In addition, those who are
arrested for hacking seem to be offered jobs working for the Federal
Security Service (FSB) instead of being sent to prison.35 Indeed, the
situation might “worsen as hacking, cracking[,] and virus writing shift
from being a mischievous hobby of young kids to a lucrative occupation
of skilled professionals working hand-in-hand with hardened
criminals.”36 While those in the past viewed hacking as a noble endeavor,
attempting to bring Western programs to the masses for free, modern
Russians are more driven by the lack of adequate jobs. 37 Hacking
magazines and software are sold on the streets, and there are plenty of
students who excel at mathematics, computer science, and physics who
are unable to find jobs.38 As recently as November 2013, the magazine
“Hacker” was released with a DVD that contained computer programs
that can crack passwords.39
Part of the problem is the fact that, while hacking is illegal in Russia,
it is not viewed as morally wrong.40 While Russians do not balk at the
issuance of “Hacker,” they would likely not tolerate a magazine aimed at
more physical crimes like burgling.41 Hackers are criminals only because
of the legal prohibitions against it, not because of any moral
opprobrium.42
Perhaps connected to this, authorities do not pursue investigations
into cyber-crime to the same extent as other crimes that are deemed
higher priorities, particularly when the hacking has not been directed at
Russian companies or organizations. 43 These hackers provide their
services for a fee, using various sites to find willing buyers.44 The fact
that hackers can use known websites and provide their services with little
to no interference from federal authorities is troubling, to say the least.45
Youth movements, with ties to the government, provide a network of
hackers that target those who are viewed as opponents of Russia,

34

Gvosdev, supra note 18, at 180–81.
Id. at 181.
36
John Blau, Russia – A Happy Haven for Hackers, COMPUTER WEEKLY (last visited Sept. 17,
2015), http://www.computerweekly.com/feature/Russia-a-happy-haven-for-hackers.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Dremliugal, supra note 28, at 160.
40
Blau, supra note 36.
41
Dremliugal, supra note 28, at 160.
42
Id.
43
Blau, supra note 36. In addition, Russian courts often choose lighter sentences when actions
are taken against hackers, even when more harsh sentences are available. Dremliugal, supra note 28,
at 160 (noting the light sentence for a cyber criminal who targeted the Russian airline Aeroflot).
44
Max Goncharov, Trend Micro Incorporated Research Paper 2012: Russian Underground
101, TREND MICRO (2012), available at http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/securityintelligence/white-papers/wp-russian-underground-101.pdf. Hackers offer to combine executable
files with PDF files resulting in toxic files ($420), denial of service attacks ($10 per hour, $1,200 per
month), botnets ($200 for 2,000 bots), social engineering services (i.e. non-software methods of
gaining access to protected information), and account hacking, among many other services. Id.
45
In assembling the data in the report, Trend Micro went to “online forums and services used
by Russian cybercriminals” and “relied on articles written by hackers on their activities, the
computer threats they create, and the kind of information they post on forums’ shopping sites.” Id. at
1.
35
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enabling the government to deny involvement.46 And because Russian
hackers are often, in some aspects, better than their Western peers, the
government has not seen the need to shut down one of its best weapons
against the West.47 As long as hackers do not target organizations inside
the country and participate in government-sponsored campaigns when
asked, the government sees no reason to shut them down.48
III. LINKING RUSSIA AND RUSSIANS TO PAST CYBER-CRIMES
A. Estonia in 2007
In 2007, a feud erupted between Estonia and Russia over the removal
of a Soviet war monument from the center of Tallinn to a military
cemetery.49 In the following weeks, rioting and looting by thousands of
ethnic Russians ensued, which Estonia purported was orchestrated by
Russia.50 In Russia, Estonia’s embassy was attacked.51 Amidst all of the
physical violence and confrontations, a cyber battle was raging against
both Estonia’s State websites and private sites: a series of “denial of
service” attacks rendered the sites inoperable.52 Sites that averaged one
thousand visits per day received two thousand hits per second.53 Some of
the attacks defaced Estonian websites, adding Russian propaganda or
bogus apologies to the sites.54 The attacks lasted approximately three
weeks, during which Estonia requested that Russia help stop the attacks
to no avail. 55 Finally, Estonia reached out to NATO allies for
assistance.56
The financial losses alone from the relatively simple attacks were
quite staggering, with some estimating the total at 750 million euros.57
While Estonia claimed that some of the earliest attacks came from
computers with ties to the Russian government, most of the attacks came
from ordinary computers throughout the world.58 Instructions on how to
46

Gvosdev, supra note 18, at 181–82.
Antone Gonsalves, Why Russian Hackers Are Beating Us, CSO ONLINE (Aug. 28, 2014,
7:01 PM), http://www.csoonline.com/article/2600212/data-protection/why-russian-hackers-arebeating-us.html#tk.rss_news?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=infor
mation_security%20 (describing how Russians strategically think several moves ahead both
defensively and offensively and how the government views underground hacking as a national
resource). The Russian marketplace for hacking services has been described as the “true Silicon
Valley of the East,” providing the “greatest expertise when it comes to ethical hacking, penetration
testing[,] and black-hat hacking.” Id.
48
Id. See also Blau, supra note 36 (discussing a penalty, albeit a light one, for a criminal who
targeted Aeroflot).
49
David Weissbrodt, Cyber-Conflict, Cyber-Crime, and Cyber Espionage, 22 MINN. J. INT’L
L. 347, 349–50 (2013).
50
Estonia and Russia: A Cyber-Riot, THE ECONOMIST 42 (May 12, 2007).
51
Id.
52
Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to Cyberattacks: A Justification
for the Use of Active Defenses Against States Who Neglect Their Duty to Prevent, 201 MIL. L. REV.
1, 5 (2009).
53
Christopher Rhoads, Cyber Attack Vexes Estonia, Poses Debate, WALL ST. J. (May 18, 2007,
12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB117944513189906904.
54
Estonia and Russia, supra note 50.
55
Catherine Lotrionte, State Sovereignty and Self-Defense in Cyberspace: A Normative
Framework for Balancing Legal Rights, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 825, 897–98 (2012).
56
Sklerov, supra note 52, at 5.
57
Gvosdev, supra note 18, at 183.
58
Estonia and Russia, supra note 50.
47
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perform a “denial of service” attack spread on Russian-language Internet
sites. 59 Of course, any attempt to link the attacks to the Russian
government is significantly complicated because of the use of
“botnets”—computers that have been infected by a virus and take part in
the attacks without the owner of the computer knowing.60 Articles at the
time noted the lack of appropriate recourse for such targeted attacks.61
Even if there were a proper recourse, there is little evidence to prove that
the Russian government was behind the attacks. IP addresses can be
cloned and “botnets” can be used, making it difficult, if not impossible,
to determine whether or not the Russian government was involved in the
attacks.62
In the aftermath of the attacks, Russia refused to assist Estonia in
tracking down the attackers.63 They refused to investigate the incident at
all.64 Two years after the attacks, a leader from a pro-Kremlin youth
group, Nashi, claimed that the youth group had orchestrated the cyber
attacks. 65 While Nashi appears to be well-supported among Russian
youth, there are also allegations that the Kremlin pays people to attend
protests and rallies. 66 In addition, emails have been revealed which
purport that Nashi has been used as a tool for pro-Putin propaganda.67
B. South Ossetia in 2008
In August 2008, Russia invaded Georgia to expel its forces from
South Ossetia.68 This was the first large-scale cyber attack conducted
parallel to traditional military operations.69 The cyber attacks isolated
Georgia from the outside world and had significant informational and
psychological impacts. For example, Georgia was not able to
communicate information to its citizens during the conflict.70 The initial
attacks targeted news and government websites, starting just shortly
before the commencement of the physical altercations, seemingly
indicating that the attackers were involved with the government or at
least had obtained reliable inside information about the date of the
planned attack beforehand.71 Similar to the attacks against Estonia, the
initial attacks against Georgia were denial of service attacks carried out

59

Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Binoy Kampmark, Cyber Warfare Between Estonia and Russia, CONTEMP. REV.
288 (Autumn 2007) (“International law remains silent, caught off guard in the face of such
technological onslaughts. International aggression, for one, remains a state-centred concept, despite
the challenges mounted by the terrorist fascination of GWOT . . . . ‘Aggression’, reads one UN
General Assembly resolution, ‘is the use of armed force by a State against . . . another State . . . .”).
62
Wang & Rasbrock, supra note 26, at 119.
63
Sklerov, supra note 52, at 10.
64
Lotrionte, supra note 55, at 897–98.
65
PAULO SHAKARIAN, JANA SHAKARIAN & ANDREW RUEF, INTRODUCTION TO CYBERWARFARE: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 19 (2013). Nashi was also named as the culprit in the
attacks in a top-secret 2009 NSA report. Perlroth, supra note 2.
66
SHAKARIAN ET AL., supra note 65, at 19.
67
Id.
68
Lotrionte, supra note 55, at 898.
69
SHAKARIAN ET AL., supra note 65, at 24.
70
Sklerov, supra note 52, at 5.
71
Id. at 4–5.
60
61
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through botnets.72 The particular botnets used against Georgian websites
were affiliated with criminal organizations in Russia, including the
Russian Business Network.73
The second phase of the attacks broadened the targets. Instead of just
attacking media and government sites, the hackers also targeted financial
institutions, businesses, education institutions, and Western media
companies. The strategy involved defacement of websites in addition to
the denial of service attacks.74 The second phase also involved recruiting
Russian computer users—hacktivists—especially those who were
members of youth movements, including Nashi. 75 Many websites,
including StopGeorgia.ru, provided instructions on launching denial of
service attacks that were accessible even to novice users. 76 These
websites were well policed by administrators, limiting access to U.S.based security scans and removing references to military operations.77
Despite Georgian attempts to limit Russian attacks by filtering IP
addresses, the attackers hid or spoofed their IP addresses and continued
their attacks.78
After the conflict in Georgia, one Russian individual described how
he became a “cyber warrior” by following some steps on different blog
sites:
In less than an hour, I had become an Internet soldier. I
didn’t receive any calls from Kremlin operatives . . . .
My experiment also might shed some light on why the
recent cyberwar has been so hard to pin down and why
no group in particular has claimed responsibility. . . .
[W]e risk underestimating the great patriotic rage of
many ordinary Russians, who, having been fed too much
government propaganda in the last few days, are
convinced that they need to crash Georgian Web sites.
Many Russians undoubtedly went online to learn how to
make mischief, as I did. Within an hour, they, too, could
become cyberwarriors.79
While there are certainly official cyber units in Russia, handshake
arrangements or other secretive relationships between the government
and hackers provide a way for the government to plausibly deny the
allegations that it is engaging in cyber warfare.80 The fact that there was
apparently a detailed cyber attack plan in place, ready to go into action,
would seem to indicate that the hackers’ efforts were “probably
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coordinated . . . with the Russian military even if no conclusive evidence
exists of such collaboration.”81
Despite significant research by the Grey Goose project and the U.S.
Cyber Consequences Unit, there is no conclusive evidence that links the
Russian government to the cyber-attacks launched against Estonia or
Georgia.82 Despite the lack of conclusive evidence, there is some heft to
the idea that the government was involved.
C. Target in 2013
From late November through the middle of December 2013, the U.S.
retail chain Target was the victim of a hack that compromised the data of
millions of customers, including information of forty million credit and
debit card accounts.83 Soon after the breach, the data was available on the
black market. 84 All told, personal data for up to seventy million
customers were taken in the attack.85 Target and its partners lost more
than two hundred million dollars as a consequence of the breach.86
The attack was not limited to Target, however. The same virus used
in the Target attack also reached over one thousand other U.S.
businesses.87 More recently, Home Depot suffered a similar attack dating
from approximately April 2014 until September 2014.88 Similar to the
previous attacks in Estonia and Georgia, there is nothing to link the
Russian government to these attacks. But unlike the prior two incidents,
there is little political incentive for Russia to go after retailers in the
United States.
Still, there is some evidence that a teenage Russian hacker created
the malware that caused the security breach in these cases.89 While he did
not actually attack the department stores, he purportedly wrote the
software that was eventually sold to the cyber attackers.90 The malware
was offered for sale for approximately two thousand dollars, with
discounts offered to those who agreed to share any profits made by using
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the software.91 Part of the malware was written in Russian.92 In addition,
the information that was stolen from Target shoppers was taken from a
server in the United States and then sent to a server in Russia.93 Of
course, even the assertions that a Russian citizen created the malware and
that the data were eventually sent to Russia does not implicate the
Russian government in the attacks for many of the reasons that have been
discussed above. Due to the relative ease with which information can be
obscured digitally and the fact that the information can be later retrieved
from a server in Russia and sent elsewhere, it is impossible to say if the
actual attackers were located in Russia.
D. Ongoing Attacks—Energy Companies, Financial Institutions,
and More
While not as significant as the attacks against Estonia and Georgia,
cyber-attacks happen continually. These attacks generally focus on
stealing money from international banks and corporations and personal
data from individuals in order to commit fraud. 94 This year alone,
Russian hackers have been blamed for attacking oil and gas companies,95
placing a digital bomb in the NASDAQ, 96 hacking financial
institutions,97 and spying on both the Ukrainian government and a U.S.
scholar who specializes in Russian culture.98 In addition, breaches into
the White House computer networks and government computer networks
have occurred with some degree of regularity.99 While most of these
events were relatively benign in terms of their effects, the potential
effects—particularly related to the energy companies—could be quite
devastating. 100 The motives in these cases seem to be industrial or
91
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corporate espionage, which would be a violation of the rights of the
companies for their intellectual property. However, more troubling is that
the method used by the hackers “also gives them the opportunity to seize
control of industrial control systems from afar.”101 The Russian groups
that invaded the energy companies could have used their “toehold in
some networks to inflict damage, like blowing up an oil rig or power
facility,” but there is no evidence that they intended to do that.102
In addition to attacks that are focused on shutting down websites,
Russian sources, including State intelligence services, have been accused
of pursuing hacking activities to steal economic information and
technology from targets in the United States, specifically targeting
research and development.103 Russia and China were singled out in a
recent report for being “the foreign intelligence services and countries
that are doing the most harm.”104 In particular, areas where the U.S. has
had a competitive advantage were targeted: pharmaceuticals, aeronautics,
and advanced manufacturing techniques. 105 While China is the
predominant threat in targeting U.S. intellectual property and trade
secrets, Russia is also a significant source of problems.106
IV. EXISTING STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CRIMINAL ACTIONS OF
ITS CITIZENS THAT HAVE IMPACTS OUTSIDE OF THE STATE
Given the potentially far ranging and damaging effects of these
attacks on outside nations, some important questions need to be asked.
What is the duty of Russia with respect to controlling its citizens? Can
the attacks be attributed to Russia? Can Russia be held responsible for
the actions of its citizens? Attribution and State responsibility are key
facets of international law. Without attribution of actions to a State or the
responsibility of a State with respect to those actions, nations may be left
without adequate recourse.107 Without a responsible State, a country is
left with few options to protect itself from outside threats. Specifically,
the State could develop greater defensive capabilities in its own cyber
system, strike out against those who are believed to be the attackers, or
attempt to reach a diplomatic solution to the problem with the country
that is host to the cyber attackers.
However, none of these solutions seems to be an adequate response.
Developing effective defenses takes time and resources, and the defenses
are often quickly circumvented by continually evolving attacks. Counterattacks are not likely to deter future threats because of the speed and ease
with which the attackers set up new equipment. Finally, current world
dynamics do not exert sufficient pressure on countries for them to
101
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regulate attacks originating within their own borders. Some have argued
that counting only on passive defense mechanisms, such as anti-virus
programs, firewalls, encryption, and automated detection, will lack any
significant power of deterrence because such measures do not collect
data that can lead to an identification of the perpetrator and thus allows
the perpetrator to evade prosecution. In other words, the wrongful acts
will continue with impunity.108
A. Attribution under the Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts
The Draft articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts provide thorough understanding of the existing customary
international law on attribution of the actions of non-State actors to
States.109 The articles describe the baseline for assessing whether a State
should be held responsible for the effects of actions of individuals or
groups with ties to the State. 110 There are several ways to attribute
conduct to a State. According to the articles, actions by organs of that
State, as defined by the internal law of the State, qualify as acts of the
State itself.111 This applies to all levels of government, such as central,
provincial, and local, and all branches of government, including
legislative, executive, and judicial.112 Even actions of institutions that are
autonomous in a given country but are normally institutions of the
government, such as the police force, will be attributed to the State.113
In addition, if a person or entity “is in fact acting on the instructions
of, or under the direction or control of that State in carrying out the
conduct,” the conduct is considered an act of the State.114 For instance,
“when State organs supplement their own action by recruiting or
instigating private persons or groups who act as ‘auxiliaries’ while
remaining outside the official structure of the State,” the actions of those
private persons or groups are attributable to the State.115 Direction or
control presents a more complex issue,116 as will be discussed below with
regard to cases from the International Court of Justice. It “does not
extend to conduct which was only incidentally or peripherally associated
with an operation.”117 Only one of the three requirements, “instructions,”
“direction,” or “control,” must be met, but it must relate to the wrongful
conduct.118
In addition to the draft articles, international courts have provided
insight into what is required for attribution of acts to a State. In
108
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particular, the International Court of Justice, in its Nicaragua v. United
States and Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro cases,
established a framework for analyzing the relationship between the
parties and States.
In Nicaragua v. United States, the United States was accused of
“recruiting, training, arming, equipping, financing, supplying and
otherwise encouraging, supporting, aiding, and directing military and
paramilitary actions in and against Nicaragua,” thus constituting a use of
force against Nicaragua with armed attacks.119 After an initial period of
covert operations, official statements by the President of the United
States made clear that the U.S. government had been giving support to
the contras, those who were fighting against the Nicaraguan
government. 120 Congressional budgetary legislation “made specific
provision for funds to be used by United States intelligence agencies for
supporting ‘directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in
Nicaragua.’”121 Financing for the military and paramilitary activities of
the contras was a part of the budget of the United States from 1981 until
1984. 122 The financing was used by the CIA to provide “arms,
munitions[,] and military equipment, including uniforms, boots[,] and
radio equipment,”123 along with training in “guerrilla warfare, sabotage,
demolitions, and in the use of a variety of weapons” and intelligence
regarding Nicaraguan troop movements.124
In sum, the support provided by the United States to the contras
included, at different times, “logistic support, the supply of information
on the location and movements of . . . troops, the use of sophisticated
methods of communication, the deployment of field broadcasting
networks, radar coverage, etc.”125 In addition, several of the military and
paramilitary operations “were decided and planned, if not actually by
United States advisers, then at least in close collaboration with them, and
on the basis of the intelligence and logistic support” which the United
States offered.126 U.S. “authorities largely financed, trained, equipped,
armed and organized” the contras in their fight with the Nicaraguan
government.127
Despite the “heavy subsidies and other support provided . . . by the
United States,” the Court determined that there was “no clear evidence of
the United States having actually exercised such a degree of control in all
fields as to justify” impugning the actions of the contras to the United
States. 128 In coming to this conclusion, the Court noted that contra
activity continued, even after military aid was no longer authorized.129
Thus, the contras could not be said to be in a state of “complete
119
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dependence” on the State.130 In establishing the degree of control of a
State over a non-State group, the selection, installation, and payment of
leaders of the group is but one factor.131 In addition, even given the
“financing, organizing, training, supplying[,] and equipping of the
contras, the selection of its military or paramilitary targets, and the
planning of the whole of its operation,” not all acts committed by the
contras could be attributed to the United States—the United States would
need to have had “effective control of the military or paramilitary
operations in the course of which the alleged violations were
committed.”132
In Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro, Bosnia &
Herzegovina attempted to attribute the actions of Republika Srpska,
namely its army, the Vojska Republike Srpske (VRS) in committing
atrocities in the city of Srebrenica to Yugoslavia.133 “Thousands of men
and boys were summarily executed and buried in mass graves within a
matter of days” while the international community attempted to gain
access to them. 134 The women, children, and elderly people “were
uprooted and, in an atmosphere of terror, loaded onto overcrowded buses
. . . and transported across the confrontation lines into Bosnian Muslimheld territory.”135 Military-aged men were “taken prisoner, detained in
brutal conditions[,] and then executed.”136 There were allegedly close ties
between Yugoslavia and Republika Srpska politically and financially;
Yugoslavia also allegedly had ties to the administration and control of
the VRS.137 For slightly over ten percent of the officers in the VRS,
“payment, promotions, pensions, etc. were handled, not by the Republika
Srpska, but by the [Yugoslavian army].”138 The VRS was also “armed
and equipped” by Yugoslavia, with up to ninety percent of its material
needs being supplied by Yugoslavia. 139 The Court determined that
Yugoslavia “was . . . making its considerable military and financial
support available to the Republika Srpska, and had it withdrawn that
support, this would have greatly constrained the options that were
available to the Republika Srpska authorities.”140
In evaluating whether the acts were attributable to Yugoslavia, the
Court began its analysis with an investigation into the legal recognition
of the perpetrators of the action.141 If the acts were not perpetrated by
organs of the State, it needed to determine if they “were committed by
persons who, while not organs of the [State], did nevertheless act on the
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instructions of, or under the direction or control of, the [State].” 142
Organs of a State can be either de jure organs, those that hold the status
of organ under the internal law of a State,143 or de facto organs, those that
“in fact act under such strict control by the State that they must be treated
as its organs.”144 Even substantial financial support does not make a
group a State organ.145 Referring back to its Nicaragua decision, the
Court reiterated that a de facto organ is a body over which a State
“exercise[s] such a degree of control in all fields” and which is in
“complete dependence on [the State’s] aid.” 146 However, “complete
dependence” will not be found often, as “to equate persons or entities
with State organs when they do not have that status under internal law
must be exceptional, for it requires proof of a particularly great degree of
State control over them.”147
In keeping with this standard, despite the “strong and close”
“political, military[,] and logistical relations” between the federal
authorities of Yugoslavia and Republika Srpska, they were not of such a
degree as to prevent Republika Srpska from acting with “some qualified,
but real, margin of independence.” 148 In addition, even though the
support given by Yugoslavia was such that Republika Srpska “could not
have ‘conduct[ed] its crucial or most significant military and paramilitary
activities’” without it, it was not in a state of “total dependence.”149
After deciding that VRS was neither a de jure nor a de facto organ of
Yugoslavia, the Court considered whether attribution could be founded
on “direction or control.” 150 While this may seem similar to the
determination of a de facto organ of the State, this investigation instead
relates to Article 8 of the Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts. 151 This question does not deal with the general
circumstances surrounding the group, but instead whether the State, “in
the specific circumstances surrounding [a particular event]” instructed,
directed, or controlled the group to perform the actions. 152 Again
referring back to its Nicaragua case, the Court reiterated that legal
responsibility arises if a State is in “effective control of the . . .
operations in the course of which the alleged violations were
committed.”153 Here, “complete control” is not required, only a State’s
instructions or its “effective control,” which seems to lessen the burden
on a plaintiff State.154 However, the instructions or control must be given
“in respect of each operation in which the alleged violations occurred,
not generally in respect of the overall actions taken by the persons or
groups of persons who committed the violations.” 155 In reaching its
142
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conclusion, the Court specifically rejected the application of the “overall
control” test used by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) in establishing the presence of an international
conflict for Yugoslavia with regard to the Republika Srpska and the
VRS. 156 Reports after the events in Srebrenica did not suggest that
Yugoslavian “leadership was involved in planning the attack or inciting
the killing of non-Serbs; nor [was there] any hard evidence of assistance
by the Yugoslav army to the armed forces of the Republika Srpska
before the attack,” thus actions could not be attributed to Yugoslavia.157
B. Responsibility to Prevent Damaging Acts under a Duty of Care
State responsibility has primarily developed to limit the
responsibility of a State for actions of individual private citizens or
groups within its borders.158 In the comments to the Draft articles on the
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, specific
mention is made of how all acts linked to the State by nationality,
habitual residence, or incorporation could be attributed to the State.
However, such an approach was avoided “both with a view to limiting
responsibility to conduct which engages the State as an organization, and
also so as to recognize the autonomy of persons acting on their own
account and not at the instigation of a public authority.”159 “Conduct of
private persons is not as such attributable to the State.”160 However, past
thought on the matter seemed to be more open to assigning responsibility
to a State for actions of individuals: “A state owes at all times a duty to
protect other states against injurious acts by individuals from within its
jurisdiction.”161 In coming to its conclusion, the commentary on the draft
articles cites the Tellini case of 1923.162
Tellini involved the assassination of Italian members of an
international commission while on Greek territory.163 While Tellini, an
Italian, was assisting in the delimitation of the Greece-Albania border, an
156
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unknown party ambushed him and killed him. 164 The International
Commission requested redress from Greece because it accused Greece of
exercising neglect in pursuing the criminals. 165 The Council of the
League of Nations referred the question of Greece’s responsibility for the
incident to a Special Commission. Specifically, it asked: “In what
circumstances and to what extent is the responsibility of a State involved
by the commission of a political crime in its territory?” 166 The
Commission determined that:
[T]he responsibility of a State is only involved by the
commission in its territory of a political crime against
the persons of foreigners if the State has neglected to
take all reasonable measures for the prevention of the
crime and the pursuit, arrest[,] and bringing to justice of
the criminal.167
The Commission added a caveat to its findings: “The recognized
public character of a foreigner and the circumstances in which he is
present in its territory entail upon the State a corresponding duty of
special vigilance on his behalf.”168 Thus, while the particular facts of the
Tellini case seem to limit the application of responsibility, it shows that
there are times when States could be held responsible for the actions of
private individuals within their borders.
Several Court cases have repeated this idea in different contexts. In
the Corfu Channel Case, the Court was asked to determine whether
Albania was responsible for damage caused by mines in its waters.169
British cruisers and destroyers left the port of Corfu and sailed through
the North Corfu Strait. 170 A mine heavily damaged one of the
destroyers.171 When a second destroyer attempted to tow the damaged
destroyer to safety, it too struck a mine.172 Both destroyers returned to
Corfu.173 Investigations revealed that the minefield, located in Albanian
territorial waters, had been recently laid. 174 In ascertaining the
responsibility of Albania for the damage caused by the mines, the Court
determined that Albania need not have taken part in the laying of the
mines to nonetheless be responsible.175
The Court examined whether Albania knew, or should have known,
(given potentially circumstantial evidence) that the mines had been
laid. 176 If Albania knew about the mines prior to the incident with
164
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sufficient time to warn the British vessels, it would be responsible for the
incident.177 In this case, “the obligations incumbent upon the Albanian
authorities consisted in notifying, for the benefit of shipping in general,
the existence of a minefield in Albanian territorial waters and in warning
the approaching British warships of the imminent danger to which the
minefield exposed them.”178 These obligations stem from “general and
well-recognized principles, namely: elementary considerations of
humanity . . . and every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”179
Albania’s omission—choosing to remain silent rather than to warn the
British ships—thus resulted in its international responsibility for the
incident.180
More recently, the Court reiterated the obligation of a State to
prevent or limit harm to other States in United States v. Iran. Similar to
the Corfu Channel Case, this case does not deal with government action;
instead Iran was accused of “tolerating, encouraging, and failing to
prevent and punish conduct” that resulted in the United States being
unable “to have access to its diplomatic and consular representatives,
premises[,] and archives in Iran.”181
After the United States allowed the former Shah of Iran to enter its
territory for medical treatment, large demonstrations took place in Iran,
and many demonstrators marched in front of the United States Embassy
but did not cause any issues.182 A few days later, however, an armed
group of demonstrators overran the embassy compound with no
resistance from the Iranian security personnel.183 All of the diplomatic
and consular personnel were taken hostage and detained in the
compound.184 Despite repeated calls for help, no forces were sent in time
to provide protection.185 The following day, consulates in two other cities
were seized without any protective action on the part of the Iranian
government.186
The militants who attacked the embassy had no official status as
organs of the Iranian State and there was not sufficient information
before the Court to establish a link between the militants and the State:
this was not a case of a de jure or de facto organ of the State.187 While
the Ayatollah Khomeini had issued several public declarations calling for
students “to expand with all their might their attacks against the United
States,” the declaration was far from State authorization to take the
specific actions (invading and occupying the Embassy) that were
ultimately taken.188 Even celebratory phone calls after the event “do not
177
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alter the initially independent and unofficial character of the militants’
attack on the embassy.”189 However, despite the fact that the Iranian
government was not involved in the initial actions of the militants in
seizing the embassies, its lack of action in taking any “appropriate steps”
to protect the embassy against attack or to prevent the attack demonstrate
“more than mere negligence or lack of appropriate means.”190
Because Iran was “fully aware of [its] obligations under the
conventions in force,” because it was “fully aware . . . of the urgent need
for action,” because it “had the means at [its] disposal to perform [its]
obligations,” and because it “completely failed to comply with these
obligations,” it could be held responsible for the results of the actions of
the militants. 191 Notably, however, this case deals with obligations
arising under the Vienna Conventions,192 not a customary law to prevent
harm to other nations.
It is important to note that these cases developed long before the
issuance of the draft articles on State responsibility. The Iran case was
decided twenty years prior to the articles, which, as mentioned before,
seem to downplay the ability of States to be held responsible for the
actions of private citizens.193 However, the principles and the ideas stated
are very applicable to the idea of rectifying, and hopefully reducing, the
effects of transnational cyber-crime.
V. APPLICATION TO PAST CYBER-CRIME AND POTENTIAL
APPLICATION TO FUTURE MISDEEDS
A. Difficulty of Attribution
As discussed above in reference to the various attacks in which
Russia has been implicated, no direct evidence of the involvement of a
Russian organ in the attacks has ever been found, despite an abundance
of circumstantial evidence to that effect.194 Thus, none of the situations to
date (and likely no situation in the future, barring reckless work on the
part of official State agencies) can be viewed as the actions of de jure
organs of Russia.
Attempting to apply the Nicaragua standard shows the problems
faced by States that are subject to cyber-attacks. Barring significant
missteps by the attackers, it will be nearly impossible to meet the high
threshold requirement of control that the Court has enunciated—it is
simply too difficult to pin down an exact source.195 Even the process of
189
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determining the source of an attack is fraught with difficulties. For
example, hackers can mask their location by writing the code at odd
hours or in another language to avoid detection. 196 Thus, even the
traditional tools of computer forensics—looking at the style used by the
attackers, the timing, and the targets—only leave an idea as to who
performed the attack.197 The result, however, is still a guess, even if it is a
very good guess.198 This still does not conclusively prove any connection
between the attackers and the Russian government.199
Furthermore, the differences between traditional weapon attacks and
cyber-attacks are quite dramatic. While military tactics and intel can be
shared without physical contact, sharing actual weapons requires
delivery of tangible goods. As evidenced in the Georgia scenario, cyber
weapons, particularly for more simple attacks such as denial of service
attacks, can be “distributed” by merely posting information on an open
website, then having would-be attackers read the website and perform
the attack themselves, without the need for special equipment from any
government actors.200
Quite simply, a government does not need to provide any physical
equipment to private citizens to carry out the attack. Individuals can use
their own computers or cell phones and Internet connections to launch
attacks against locations throughout the world. Again, a simple posting
on a website is all that is needed to provide “weapons,” “training,” and
“guidance” regarding what private citizens need to do in order to carry
out cyber-attacks. Contrast this with the training, arms, equipment, and
information about troop movement that were given by the United States
to the contras or the ninety percent of material support provided by
Yugoslavia to the VRS.201 Simple cyber-attacks require a much lower
level of tangible and monetary support than physical altercations.
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Even though average Russian citizens “could not have conduct[ed]
[their] crucial or most significant” cyber-attacks without guidance
(possibly from the Russian government through private websites), they
would, similar to the scenario in Bosnia & Herzegovina, not be in a state
of “total dependence” because they still maintained “some qualified, but
real, margin of independence.”202 Ordinary Russian citizens, similar to
the individuals described earlier, did not receive any call to action from
the government—instead they were inspired by their own nationalistic
feelings to launch attacks against Georgia.203 It seems to stretch credulity
to believe that loosely-associated individuals or even partially sponsored
or allied youth groups such as Nashi would be considered in “complete
dependence” on the Russian government despite any financial assistance
they may receive from it.
Even the instructions, directions, or control standard of Article 8 is
difficult to meet in this situation. Providing instructions on how to
perform a denial of service attack or intimating that cyber-crime
organizations would go unpunished if they stand ready to participate in
activities that Russia requires both seem to indicate a degree of
connection between the attackers and the government. But due to the
limited evidence of communication between the two groups, it is difficult
to say that Russia gave instructions or exercised control “in respect of
each operation in which the alleged violations occurred, not generally in
respect of the overall actions taken.”204 The very nature of cyber-crime in
Russia is that of an unspoken agreement— groups are to take action in
support of the government against outside forces and join in other efforts
when they are taking place.205 There is no need to wait for a request from
the government. While directions were given in each case (instructions
on how to perform a denial of service attack and sites to target), once
again there is no connection between those instructions and the Russian
government. 206 Instead, there appears to be a lack of any “effective
control;” the Russian government allowed the citizens to act on their
own, on behalf of their country. Even considering the potential funding
of youth groups, the connection is too tenuous—Nicaragua involved
significant and essential funding of paramilitary groups by the United
States, but the groups’ actions were still not attributable to the United
States.207
The attacks against Target and other commercial retailers in the
United States have an even more tenuous connection to the Russian
government. Unlike Estonia and Georgia, and even the later attacks
against Western financial institutions and energy companies, Russia does
not seem to have any reason to target U.S. retailers. Of course, stealing
funds from Western companies instead of Russian companies is
definitely in line with the general agreement that seems to have been
202
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made between Russian hackers and the government, but there does not
seem to be “complete dependence” or even instructions, direction, or
control. Without any real connection to the Russian government, the
attacks against Target and other U.S. businesses are even less likely to be
attributable to Russia or to Russian hackers than are the other attacks
mentioned above.
Going forward, it is likely that only attacks occurring at politically
opportune times could ever be attributable to Russia under the
framework established by Nicaragua and Bosnia & Herzegovina. Such
an attack might be targeted against financial institutions in the aftermath
of the introduction of financial sanctions against Russia or against energy
companies after the introduction of sanctions prohibiting technological
transfer from Western oil super majors to Russian companies. Because
hackers have the ability to obfuscate information and misdirect any
attempt to find the source of an attack and because outside countries are
unable to see the communications between the Russian government and
the attackers, the Nicaragua and Bosnia & Herzegovina framework does
not provide much, if any, recourse for the victims of cyber-attacks.
B. Fittingness of Holding Russia Responsible
Because of Its Hacker Culture
The somewhat older framework, as described in Tellini, Corfu
Channel Case, and Iran, seem perfectly suited to meet the needs of
protecting States. If a State is responsible for the actions of its citizens
when it has “neglected to take all reasonable measures for the prevention
of the crime and the pursuit, arrest[,] and bringing to justice of the
criminal,” then Russia’s choice to not assist Estonia should implicate
Russia as a responsible party.208 While Tellini involved political crimes,
its principle could be applicable here, particularly because Russia seems
to allow citizens to use cyber tactics against foreign entities while
vigorously preventing them from using the same tactics against its own
government. 209 Furthermore, considering the rationale stated in Iran,
even if a State is not involved in the initial actions of a rogue group of
citizens, it is still under an obligation to take “appropriate steps” to
prevent attacks or stop them—unless the State lacks the means to do
so.210 Again, Russia’s prowess in cyber matters is not debatable—other
than the United States, Russia is perhaps the most advanced cyber nation
in the world.211 It has “the means at [its] disposal” to, at the very least,
slow down or stop attacks that are in progress (especially when the
attacks continue for several weeks) and to search for those who are
responsible and attempt to prosecute them. Thus, Russia’s strong ability
in this area, combined with its decision to not assist Estonia in stopping
the attacks, finding the criminals, or even investigating the crimes, shows
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a significant degree of neglect, similar to what was described in both the
Tellini and Iran cases.
Equally cogent is the argument made by the International Court of
Justice in the Corfu Channel Case: “every State [has an] obligation not to
allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of
other States.” 212 By allowing groups of known hackers to continue
unabated during times of peace and by not interfering to stop the hackers
after cyber-attacks have begun, Russia is knowingly allowing “its
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights” of other nations—in
this case Estonia. States have an obligation to stop their own citizens
from harming other States, particularly after the victim State has reached
out for assistance in dealing with the problem, as was the case with
Estonia. This is due to the inherent disadvantages of not having physical
access to the alleged perpetrators. States are much better positioned to
control cyber-attacks that originate from within their borders, therefore
States should have greater responsibility for controlling such actions.213
For all these reasons, Russia should be held responsible for its inaction
with respect to Estonia under the principles expressed in Tellini, Corfu
Channel Case, and Iran.
This is not to say that any act by a private citizen should be
answerable by the State. Some attacks are likely not preventable—they
may happen without warning or are finished so quickly that no State
could have responded to the action in time to prevent it. The Target
incident, particularly as it relates to the purported author of the virus (but
not necessarily as it regards those who actually used the virus), fits into
this category. It is unlikely that a State will be able to prevent the
creation of every virus that private citizens set out to create.214 However,
the latter portion of the Tellini principle—“tak[ing] all reasonable
measures for . . . the pursuit, arrest[,] and bringing to justice”—are still
implicated. Thus, the fact that a Russian minor quite possibly wrote the
virus that was used against Target should not necessarily bring
responsibility upon Russia. However, the fact that Russia did not pursue
the individual or bring him to justice could be used to show that the
country should be held responsible for his actions. Thus, Russia should
be held responsible for the Target case as well.
Going forward, Russia should be subject to a higher level of
responsibility than other States due to its history of allowing hackers to
escape prosecution except when they target domestic institutions.215 The
highly provocative suggestion that Russia has handshake agreements
with hacking groups only further implicates Russia as being complicit in
the attacks that are happening and increases the ability to hold it
responsible for not responding to attacks emanating from within its
borders. While every State has a responsibility to respond to requests
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from other States regarding potential attacks that are emanating from
within their borders, Russia’s history of malfeasance should increase the
burden that Russia has in assisting the investigations of other nations
regarding cyber-attacks perpetrated by Russian citizens.
Even without the strong hint of an outright agreement between
hackers, criminal groups, and the Russian government, Russia’s record
of enforcement by itself seemingly implicates its responsibility. As
discussed above, Russia has laws regulating intellectual property rights
and cyber-crime, but it rarely enforces those laws and even more rarely
doles out punishments that could possibly act as a deterrent given the
lucrative rewards that flow to perpetrators of cyber activities.216
There are, however, some potential problems with placing such a
burden on Russia. Even determining that an attack is originating from
Russia is not clear-cut. The relatively simple nature of some cyberattacks, such as denial of service attacks, makes it difficult, if not
impossible, to conclusively find the source of the attack.217 The attacks
can originate from any location and the source addresses assigned to the
attacks can be falsified.218 Even if the message can be sourced correctly,
the originating computer could be part of a botnet—the source computer
might have been infected by a virus and might be controlled by another
computer or individual in a different location.219 As a result, it is possible
for States to frame an innocent State for an attack that did not originate
from within its borders.
Presumptively finding that Russia is the source of an attack could
sour feelings between nations. Because of its past practices, it makes
sense for hackers to mask their tracks through Russia to attempt to
implicate Russia in future attacks. With the current degree of distrust
between the West and Russia, a Western victim would likely take any
opportunity to blame Russia for an attack. Again, however, it seems
reasonable, given Russia’s history of tacit (or active) support of
hackers220 and the greater physical access that Russia has to its own
population, to require it to at least provide assistance to outside States
when they have information implicating Russian citizens in the
commission of attacks.
Another troubling implication of assigning State responsibility for
the actions of private citizens is the possibility of greater governmental
control over the Internet, particularly in those locations where there is
already significant government control. Encouraging Russia to engage in
a more severe form of access or content control, given its significant
stake in a variety of Internet companies already,221 may only serve to
limit the ability of Russian citizens to access outside information. In
addition, the significant disconnect between what Western nations want
Russia to do and what Russian citizens expect—considering the current
overall acceptance of hacking among the Russian population222 —will
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make it difficult at best for the government to start to more strictly
enforce laws against behavior that the population does not find morally
wrong.
While there is not much recent precedent regarding holding a State
responsible for not adequately preventing or responding to attacks of
private individuals or groups, Russia seems like an ideal place to hold the
State accountable. The fact that violations of intellectual property rights
and cyber-crime often go unpunished implicates Russia as not having
taken “reasonable measures” to prevent and prosecute the perpetrators of
such acts, especially given its extraordinary strength in this area.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is a significant incentive for countries to allow hacker groups
within their borders to attack foreign countries. As long as States are not
held responsible for the actions of independent groups within their
borders, they will not feel the need to control or mitigate the effects of
these groups on outside nations. Furthermore, the relative imbalance of
power between the attackers and the victims is evident. Targets can be
chosen precisely, as evidenced in the Estonia and Georgia cases.
Attributing the effects of those attacks cannot be done with anything
even closely approximating the precision of the attacks. This asymmetry
currently encourages States to do little to stop cyber acts emanating from
within their borders because the negative effects are felt outside of the
borders. On the other hand, preventing or mitigating the attacks would
internalize the costs without necessarily providing any additional benefit.
The current attribution rules as found in the Responsibility of States
for Internationally Wrongful Acts are inadequate to enforce and maintain
peace in an increasingly cyber-dominated world. A resurgence of the
responsibility models of earlier case decisions will help States to be
protected and have recourse for cyber attacks against them. This will be
possible due to the capabilities of States to regulate the conduct of
private citizens and groups within their borders.
Based on Russia’s lax enforcement mechanisms of cyber-crime—
intellectual property related and in other areas—Russia should be held to
a higher standard than other States. It is one thing for a rogue individual
to attack an outside State. It is quite another for a State to ignore the
actions of its citizens and to choose not to pursue them when it is aware
of the damages that the citizens are causing outside of its borders. Russia
should be held responsible for the actions of its citizens, especially when
those actions are of a long duration or when Russia fails to stop the
attacks or to prosecute those who engaged in them.
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